Offshoring to China and India: Case Studies of Italian Small-Medium-sized Firms by Tattara, Giuseppe
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Offshoring to China and India: Case
Studies of Italian Small-Medium-sized
Firms
Giuseppe Tattara
University of venice, University of Venice Ca` Foscari
2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29175/
MPRA Paper No. 29175, posted 3. March 2011 02:28 UTC
 1 
International seminar on The globalization of production models and 
innovation in emerging economies, Delhi, 19-20 November 2010 
 
Offshoring to China and India: Case Studies of Italian Small-Medium-sized 
Firms1 
 
Giuseppe Tattara, 
Dept. Economics. University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venice, Italy 
ph. 00390412348148 fax 0412348176 
tattara@unive.it 
 
Abstract 
This article discusses the prospects and problems facing Italian small and medium 
sized enterprises that have recently engaged in direct investment through the 
establishment of production facilities in China and India.  Using data gathered from 
15 interviews conducted in those countries in 2009, firms are grouped for analytical 
purposes into clusters within a commodity chain framework.  Highlighted are 
important influences (such as key decisions, costs and constraints) that should be 
considered when analyzing supply chain organisation in a context of delocalisation.  
Motivations behind Italian parent companies’ decisions to create subsidiaries in 
China or India; relations between newly established production facilities and their 
local suppliers and markets; and the difficulties the new enterprises have 
encountered, and any subsequent organizational adaptations, are all taken into 
account.   In the conclusions, the benefits to the participants in the delocalisation 
process are detailed, and possible future scenarios and prospects for Italian firms 
are analysed in the light of ongoing developments in Italy’s economy.    
    
JEL: F23, F14, L25  
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1. Introduction 
 
Italian firms first initiated significant internationalization strategies in the mid-nineties 
and today the off-shoring of a part of production is an important feature of that 
country’s  manufacturing system,  in particular in the North Eastern regions of Italy 
(Schiattarella, 2001). Until the late eighties Italian firms operating in the international 
market were mainly concerned with expanding their exports, and increasing their 
share of markets in the richest countries, selling abroad products manufactured at 
home, in Italy. Since the mid-nineties, however, they began transferring production 
processes (or parts of them) to low wage countries.  
 
The purpose of this article is to explain the prospects and problems faced by Italian 
firms that recently established production facilities in China and India through direct 
investment. Foreign direct investment means the acquisition of control through 
vertical integration of activities carried out abroad, which would otherwise be carried 
out through market transactions, and inefficiently so due to market imperfections 
                                                           
1 I would like to thank the participants in the seminar of the School of economics at the University of 
Reading where the paper has been discussed. Special thanks are due to Frank Pyke, Marina della Giusta 
and Carlo Gianelle for their careful reading and valuable comments. Partial funding was provided by 
Osservatorio economico sociale, Treviso. 
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(Buckley and Casson, 1976). Over 4 months, in spring 2009, I visited several 
factories in China and India controlled by Italian parent companies, and discussed 
with their general managers the reasons underlying the decision to produce abroad, 
and the character of the governance of new networks that were created in relation to 
the parent companies, to foreign suppliers, and to the consumer market. 
 
It became profitable to develop outside Italy a part of production with the onset of 
circumstances that reduced transaction costs involved in operating abroad. The 
establishment of a fixed exchange rate in the late nineties, and the subsequent 
appreciation of the Euro, induced Italian export firms to abandon a strategy of 
making their products more competitive through currency devaluation. Currency 
devaluation was a strategy that Italian firms practised after the defeat, in the early 
seventies, of the Bretton-Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, which then 
supported  their exports, with alternating movements, for 25 years. In the nineties, 
with the defeat of the Soviet empire, new territories in Central and Eastern Europe, 
close to two of the most important countries of industrial Europe, Germany and Italy, 
opened up to foreign investment. Countries with stable social and political structures, 
educated populations, low labour costs, and fiscal regimes very favourable to foreign 
investments encouraged Italian firms to establish plants there.  
 
Until the mid-1990s, for Italian firms the role of developing Asian economies as 
places for investment was negligible.  As emerging countries, particularly in Asia, 
removed restrictions, and implemented policies to attract foreign direct investment 
inflows, new considerations of appropriate  business strategies occurred. China and 
India offer low costs of production and favourable prospects for selling. The cost of 
labour in China and India is a fraction of that in Italy, and is definitively lower than in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries; energy and components purchased on 
the local markets in Asia are definitively cheaper than those purchased in Italy; while 
firms operating in Asian markets can benefit from a growing consumer demand due 
to the rapid growth of incomes and populations (Agarwal, 1980; Kaplinsky and 
Farooki, 2010) 
 
Nonetheless, few Italian firms have established production activities in these 
countries.  Indeed, many are reluctant to launch new businesses so far away, and in 
fact many firms that did so have gone bankrupt2. It seems advantages are balanced 
by costs that relate to the considerable time lag implicit in producing in far away 
territories and in the complexity of transactions. Relations with suppliers prove to be 
difficult, especially when small firms have been involved. In particular, the 
capabilities of local suppliers are difficult to ascertain, codification is often absent and 
the standards are not those familiar in Western markets. The prospects of reaping 
the benefits of a growing demand are constrained by the fact that selling in the final 
market requires the setting up of specific retail structures adapted to the local 
country. Moreover, relations in ‘psychically distant’ markets - different in culture, 
language, levels of education and economic development - develop only gradually 
because of the high risk involved (Johansson and Vahlne, 1977). 
 
This article begins with an outline of the research methodology used in this study, in 
section 2.  The following section 3 discusses the internationalization by Italian firms 
in East Asia compared with their internationalization in Central and Eastern European 
                                                           
2  According to anecdotal evidence provided to us by the director of the Italian Foreign trade institute, and by 
the secretary of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, the story of Italian foreign investments in 
China is not encouraging.  
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countries. Section 4 discusses the structure of the commodity value chain and 
presents firm level case studies. Firms are grouped into 3 clusters according to the 
motive that induced the Italian parent company to create a subsidiary in China or 
India, and the relations that the parent company establishes with local suppliers and 
markets; each cluster is discussed in a specific sub-section (4.1, 4.2, 4.3). Section 5 
focuses on the governance of the value chain across space in territories with very 
different levels of development, and different industrial structures and competences, 
and then concludes.  
 
2. Interviewed firms 
 
To investigate Italian firms investment abroad this study uses a multiple case study 
approach. Qualitative research permits us to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the event under study but at the same allows to provide a rich 
context for processes that would otherwise be undetected. Comparative case studies 
have been chosen as a research method in order to focus on the details of the 
operation of small and medium Italian firms in Asia in comparison with actions by 
large firms.  
Cases span in a large number of sectors and involve firms with variable dimensions 
that were driven to Asia in recent years and had different purposes. The large 
majority of firms, small firms as well, had an international  expertise and followed a 
strategy of continuous geographic expansion and provided useful lenses under with 
several problems faced by a foreign firm in China can be investigated. All firms were 
challenged by the entrance in a market with an entirely new setting.  
Differences in size, in the position in the value chain (some firms are final, some 
intermediate producers) determine differences as regards international market 
orientation. Interviewed firms were evolving along different trajectories and these 
differences resulted in diverging international experiences that are subsequently 
analised. 
A "case" was defined as a single, in-depth interview with a firm administrator. 
Interviews were transcript, and sequentially analysed. The use of open interviews 
allowed a respondent driven agenda to emerge and our open categorisation of 
operations helped the Italian managers to focus on important aspects of their Chinese 
operations, without research induced biases. 
One of the most powerful tools that the writer of a case study report can use is the 
evidence of the participants' own words to "tell the story." We have followed this 
method to bring the reader into the participants' world and provide a rich context for 
understanding the phenomena under study (Van Maanen, J. (1988). Tales from the 
field: On writing ethnography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
We have interviewed 15 firms in China and India, all of which have Italian parent 
companies in part or in whole.  In fact, 12 of them are 100% controlled by a parent 
company in Italy; the remaining 3 have participation by Chinese firms.  12 of the 
Italian parent companies have additional subsidiary plants in other countries, and 13 
of them have their main headquarters in Veneto, a region in the North East of Italy.  
It was to the Asian subsidiaries of these firms that our interviews were initially 
directed. Interviews with the subsidiaries of 2 more Italian parent firms were added 
during the process. All the interviewed firms in Asia are of small or medium size. 9 of 
them belong to medium-sized groups  with  well-known brands. 6  belong to large 
groups: 4 belong to the Carraro Group, 1 to Filmanmade Group Technical Textiles 
(FMMG), and 1 to Tessitura Monti. The Carraro Group has worldwide more than 4.000 
employees, Filmanmade  and Monti around 1000. 
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Semi structured interviews were conducted both in Italy and in Asia in two waves 
between October 2008 and June 2009. All interview persons held a leading top 
management position. The number of interviews totalled 19. Each interview lasted at 
least two hours, in many cases half a day, and in all cases implied a visit to the 
factory, both in Italy and  in Asia. All interviews were cinducted in Italian but 2 that 
was conducted in English. The interview focused on company background and 
marketing policy, motivations for the entry into the Asian market, the position of the 
firm in the value chain (the relation with the main customer) or the Chinese 
consumers and brand policy, the policy towards local suppliers. 
Information was complemented by interviews to two professional offices sustaining 
Italian firms in Asia and by follow-up contacts, review of press releases and company 
material. 
The majority of the interviewed firms, 10 out of 15, belong to the mechanical 
engineering sector. Carraro Group is a leading firm in the production of axles, 
transmissions, and final and slew drives for agricultural and construction equipment; 
the group is the parent company of 4 interviewed firms. The directors of the two 
Carraro factories, in China (Quingdao) and in India (Pune) have been interviewed 
during a visit to the plants; I have interviewed also the directors of the 2 plants of 
the GearWorld division of the Carraro Group, TurboGears in India (Pune) and 
MiniGears in China (Suhzou). In the mechanical sector we have interviewed the 
directors of Maschio, General Fittings, Irsap Jintaige Radiator, Hydroeast, Changsu 
Ritmo Welding Technology (RitmoAsia) and Zamperla. Maschio manufactures under 
its own brand agricultural machinery, Hydroeast and RitmoAsia produce mechanical 
products, Zamperla manufactures amusement rides and designs park layouts. 
 
5 of the interviewed firms that are reported in table 1 belong to the “traditional 
manufacturing” sector of textiles and furniture. I have interviewed the managers of 
Tessitura Monti India, a subsidiary of Gruppo Monti, that weaves cotton of the highest 
quality; FMMG, a producer of high performance yarns; Colombini; Beijing Great 
Faram Wall Decoration; and Dalian Mato, which make furniture & its components.  
For Carraro, Maschio, FMMG and Monti I have supplemented the interviews at the 
foreign plants with interviews in their  parent firms in Italy. Table 1 summarizes the 
main features of the interviewed firms. 
 
Table 1. Interviewed firms 
 
Interviwed subsidiary firm Parent company in Italy Name  of the firm 
Year of 
 
establish
ment  
Employees 
at the time 
of the visit 
 
Turnover 
millions € 
in 2008 
Name, location 
and date of the 
interview 
Legal ownership/ 
Initial investment in 
€ 
 Significance in 
relation to the  
parent 
company 
turnover 
Markets where the 
offshored 
subsidiary operates 
        
Tessitura Monti 
India 
2001 450  17 Treviso, 
2008 
100% control 
Tessitura monti 
50 millions 
> 70%  50% in Europe 
50% in Asia (40% 
to Aquarelle)  
Carraro India    Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
Carraro Group 
15 millions 
<10% sales in India and 
Europe (50%) 
Turbo Gears, 
India 
  13  Padova, 
2008 
100% control 
GearWorld 
20 millions 
<10% Sales to Carraro 
India and to Indian 
firms 
Beijing Great 
Faram Wall 
Decoration 
China 
  2002-
03 
142  7,5  50% controlled by 
Faram and 50% by 
Beijing Municipality/ 
2 millions 
<10% International 
furniture market 
(70%)  and China 
(30%) 
Dalian Mato 2005-   320  7,5  100% control <20% Ikea USA (30%), 
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Furn&Compt  China,  2006 Mobilclan 
10 millions 
Auri’s Kitchen  UK, 
and France 
FMMG China 2006 93 (7) 5  Treviso, 
2010 
100% control FilMan 
MadeGroup/ 
20 millions 
<10% Glen Raven  (60%) 
and Italy 
Colombini, 
China 
2005  2,6   80% control by 
Colombina 
2 millions 
<10% China, its own retail  
network  
Irsap Jintaige 
Radiators, 
China 
2005 150 1,9   100% control by 
Irsap Group 
5 millions 
<10% China 
Carraro, China 2006 138 11 Padova, 
2008 
100% control by 
Carraro Group 
18 millions 
<10% Cina, Usa, Europe 
MiniGears, 
China 
 268 14 Padova, 
2008 
100% control by  
GearWorld 
11 million 
<10% China, Usa 
Maschio China   4,4  Padova, 
2008 
100% control by 
Maschio&Gaspardo 
3 millions 
<5% Usa, Italy 
Changsu Ritmo 
Welding 
Technology 
2005 22 0,7  100% control by 
Ritmo 
0,2 millions 
<5% Asia (80%), Italy 
Hydroeast 2004 11 0,3  100% Idrobase 
0,1 millions 
<5% Europe (95%), 
Russia 
Zamperla 2006 64 5,0  100% Zamperla 
1,3 millions 
<10% China and Asia 
General Fittings 2005 99 2,1  100% Gambari 
Group 
3 millions 
<10% China  (25-50%) and 
Europe 
 
 
All firms employ modern technology for their sector, and use, whenever necessary, 
European components in order to preserve product quality.  However, sometimes 
the use of low cost of labour is reflected by low levels of automation. For example, 
activities such as stock control, warehouse usage, and quality control are often 
manually executed;  in contrast,  the corresponding operations in Italy would have 
been organized with a higher level of automation. 2 firms (General Fittings and 
Irsap Jintaige Radiators), made extensive use of machinery transferred to China 
from Italian parent companies, which then updated it with more automated 
technology.  
 
 
3. Off-shoring and production internationalization 
 
All the parent firms but 3 have other factories abroad and for them the move to 
Asia can be considered a step in a process of incremental acquisition of knowledge 
of foreign markets (Johanson and Vahle, 1977). The majority have plants in Central 
and Eastern Europe: in Poland, in Russia and in Slovenia, but especially in Romania, 
where numerous firms from Italy moved their production at the end of the nineties, 
particularly from the Veneto region. Today, in the most developed area of Romania 
there are difficulties in labour recruitment because of the massive emigration of 
Romanians abroad. Due to a reduction in transport costs, and to the constant 
appreciation of the Euro in relation to the Dollar, the cost of labour in Eastern and 
Central Europe has risen considerably and we now see a transfer of production from 
Europe to North Africa and to Asia. In the most recent years, China, and to a lesser 
degree, India, have offered for the European investors not only a reservoir of cheap 
labour but also enormous and profitable consumer markets. Available data on direct 
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investments confirm a relative stagnation of flows moving from Italy to CEE 
countries (+16% between 2002 and 2008 measured by the number of employees), 
while direct investments redirected towards Asia have rapidly increased (+35%). 
 
Internationalization takes multiple forms, including commodity flows, 
subcontracting, direct investments, commercial and technological agreements, 
licences and other arrangements formal and informal. Data is currently available in 
a systematic way for trade flows and direct investments.  
Italy’s imports from some CEE countries are mainly concerned with clothing and 
footwear subcontracting. This is particularly the case for Romania, from where 61% 
of imported goods to Italy in  2008 were connected to the sub-contracting trade. 
For Romania, imports from that country into Italy are an end stage of a process 
which firstly saw the export of semi-manufactured goods and raw materials from 
Italian based firms to firms in Romania, owned either by local or Italian 
entrepreneurs; then the Romanian firms used the imported materials to 
manufacture and subsequently re-export to Italy finished products or advanced 
level parts, which are then distributed (Crestanello and Tattara, 2010).  
 
Levels of imports to Italy of textiles, clothing and footwear from Romania were close 
to imports from China in value until 2006. Subsequently, China took the lead, but 
products imported from China have been mainly produced utilizing a model of full 
package outsourcing by Italian brands. Under this model, articles are manufactured 
by large local firms capable of processing high volumes at low prices; and raw 
materials and accessories are acquired directly in the Asian market, where it is 
possible to find quality and variety. There is not an equal flow of exports from Italy 
to China for these commodities. In contrast, Romanian imports and exports with 
Italy are of similar values because Italian exports to that country provide the basic 
materials for producing future imports.  
 
In clothing and footwear, internationalization is accomplished by large flows of 
commodities across a country’s borders, i.e. by market transactions. Due to the 
importance of subcontracting, Italian commodity flows are basically reciprocal with  
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Tattara, 2005). 
 
In the mechanical industry a different situation exists. In this industry, proprietary 
knowledge of key aspects of the industrial technology is important. Usually, when a 
firm from one country establishes a new factory or centre in another, transactions 
that are established in the new country of settlement are not simple arm-length 
relations (market transactions), but require strict interaction among actors in the 
value chain and thus stronger forms of governance3.  
 
Italian foreign direct investments are overall bigger in Central and Eastern European 
countries than in Asia, but for CEE countries investments are mainly in “traditional 
sectors” while in Asia the mechanical industry is important (figure 1) and has been 
gaining ground rapidly in recent years. The rate of increase in the number of Italian 
foreign direct investments in CEE countries from 2002 to 2008 is nil in traditional 
sectors and positive in mechanical industries (+5%), while both sectors have grown 
at significant rates in Asia (respectively 18% and 54%). Foreign direct investment 
plays a relatively more important role in Asia than in CEE countries, in mechanical 
industries more than in clothing-footwear, because of distance and transaction 
complexity. 
                                                           
3 For this classification Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005, 85 ff.) 
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Figure 1. Italian Foreign Direct Investments in 2008 
 
 
4. Case studies: medium size firms as part of global value chains 
 
Global commodity chain analysis has three main dimensions. First, an input-output 
structure which links various nodes of production, consumption and distribution into 
a chain of economic activities in which value added is produced. Second, a 
territoriality in the sense that the various activities in the chain are geographically 
situated (Smith et al. 2002). Third a governance structure that explains how global 
value chain are governed in relation to the transactions with members of the chain 
and to the capabilities of the supply-base (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005, 
78) 
 
In this section I analyse the structure of commodity chains in the mechanical, 
furniture and textiles industries by presenting case studies of firms which are 
located in China and India and controlled by Veneto firms. The case studies have 
been summarized  in par. 2- table 1. 
Firms moved to China and India from different perspectives and each firm gave rise 
to different forms of governance according to the firm’s aims, size, control of the 
market and relations with its suppliers. The variety of situations has been grouped 
in three clusters that range from a low level of interdependence and a high power 
asymmetry where the foreign plant is set up to reduce costs of production and to 
supply back to the parent company a cheap product under direct supervision; to 
situations where the factory abroad takes over several functions because of the 
complexity of the product; to firms producing and taking over some distribution 
functions as well, selling in the foreign market with their own brand a product 
engineered in Italy and  adapted accordingly to  local market needs.  
 
The first cluster groups firms whose initial purpose is to manufacture a simple 
product for the parent company in a hierarchical form of governance. This  strategy 
was initially pursued by General Fittings, RitmoAsia, Maschio, and Hydroeast, but 
which  has to varying degrees  evolved. General Fittings and RitmoAsia, once they 
had settled  in Asia, searched for their own production and sale niches on that 
market, engendering a change in the governance relation that was not planned in 
advance, but was necessary to their survival. 
 
The second cluster groups medium size firms that produce for third parties under 
subcontracting agreement and also sell directly on the components market complex 
products: Carraro, TurboGeras, MiniGears, FMMG and Dalian Mato. The main 
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customers of Carraro sell  machinery directly in Asia, and have pressed the Italian 
parent company  to open production units in Asia to shorten the time to market of 
the product and to maintain quality: Carraro produces complex components not 
likely to be found in the local market and whose immediate availability is crucial for 
the buyer whose reputation is based on an efficient post sale service (the supply of 
spare parts). The localization of activities within the Chinese and Indian markets is 
explained by several factors, which include the management of a complex product, 
not easily codifiable, and which  requires attentive transactions with local suppliers, 
and the respect of strict consignement terms. 
 
The third cluster groups Monti, Faram, Colombini, Irsap, and Zamperla, a set of 
firms that sell on the final market with their own brand. These firms were 
established in Asia in the search for both lower costs of production and access to a 
large market; direct sales from Italy to China, or to the broader international 
market, were inhibited by the high cost of the Italian product and by the distance. 
These firms are fairly independent from their parent companies, and market directly 
their own production under the company brand name.  
 
4.1. From contract manufacturing to the Chinese market. This cluster groups 
small sized Italian firms that have opened factories in China in order to produce 
lower cost components for their parent companies (Li et al., 2008)4.  
 
General Fitting, a firm located in Brescia (Italy), is part of the Gambari Group, and 
is leader in the fittings sector for plumbing and heating. It has plants in Italy, 
Mexico, and Romania and in 2005 it opened a plant in China (Nancjing) in order to 
reduce production costs. At the beginning of 2007, production for the Italian parent 
company  started. The production manager tells us: 
 
“ It was contract manufacturing for the most simple fittings, that are no longer 
produced in Italy. However, high quality forged brass rods made to standard CW617 
– the standard required by the American and the European market for fittings - are 
not locally available. So brass rods were purchased in Italy by the parent company 
Gambari, were then sent to China, and then manufactured die cast, and the fittings 
were then sent back to the Italian company that distributed them. On the whole, 
the process provided only a marginal contribution to the Group turnover, and 
production was not very profitable both because in China the cost of labour is 
relatively high in respect to other South Asian countries and also the brass rods sent 
from Italy were made more expensive by the time and cost of transport” 
 
In die cast manufacturing, the cost of labour in the Chinese plant is 30% of the 
manufacturing cost; the remaining part is accounted for by plant amortization and 
depreciation, metal losses, and energy (which in Nancjing costs  50% less than  in 
Italy). The Chinese plant is less automated than the Italian plant, especially in 
respect of the movement  of components, and taking everything into account  the 
                                                           
4 Maschio’s factory in China, at Quingdao, is part of this group. It is a small factory located in rented 
premises, and produces small agricultural machines (rotary tillers) and a basic gear box for the parent 
company. The cost of labour in the factory is 4% of the total cost and 70% are components, mainly 
outsourced; in Italy the cost of labour is 35% of the total for the same gearbox. Maschio faces no quality 
problem as these machines are unsophisticated and the components required have large tolerances. 
Profitability of producing in China is explained in the following terms: cost of production for the gear box 
is 90€ in China and 130€ in Italy. The cost of sending  the China produced gearbox to Italy is less than 
1€ each all included (freight, duties etc). 60% of  production is sent  to Italy, and 40% to Maschio 
representatives in the United States.  
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overall cost reduction is limited to 25%  of the cost of same product manufactured 
in Italy, and so not worth the initial investment that was substantial (table1). 
 
At the end of 2007 a new management decided that the Chinese plant needed to 
change its function, and to move from contract manufacturing for its parent 
company to producing brass components for the Chinese market. At the time of the 
interview 25% of total production was sold in China. It was a complex move 
because the Chinese market does not demand sanitary metal fittings for private 
houses where fittings are mainly low quality plastic ones, and the new manager has 
been gearing production towards the automotive and shipbuilding industries. Today, 
General Fittings China supplies a wide range of standard products as well as articles 
tailor-made to specific customer demands. This change in functionality has reduced 
brass imports because in China Western accreditations are not required; General 
Fittings uses brass that is purchased in the local market and competes successfully 
with local producers. 
 
RitmoAsia shares part of this story of learning and adapting. Ritmo Group produces 
welding machines for any size of plastic pipes and has entered China to reduce 
manufacturing costs. The building is rented and the initial investment has been kept 
to minimum. The Group has production plants in Italy and Bulgaria and the 
production made by the plant in China is marginal to the Group turnover. Ritmo 
entered China because two important customers required a lower price and the 
initial purpose of the investment was to assemble in Asia machines that were 
produced in Italy and sell them there. But to assemble in China parts and 
components manufactured in Italy did not provide a great advantage and the selling 
price was still three times that of similar machines sold by competitors on the 
Chinese market, at least for the most simple manual machines; and Ritmo lost its 
clients5.  
 
To off-shore the assembly line was not the correct strategy; the import of 
components was burdened by duties that varied between 5 and 15% of the 
imported value (no drawback was allowed because the machines were sold in the 
local market) and at the beginning the imported components made 70% of the final 
value. The turnover for the first couple of years was very small, a few hundred 
thousand Euros. In 2008 the strategy of Ritmo changed. A new manager created a 
new brand, RitmoAsia, and launched a line tailored to the East Asian market 
(including China and Indonesia). The aim was to manufacture locally almost the 
entire product, whilst maintaining good quality and reducing drastically imports 
from Italy which by the time of the interview were reduced almost to nothing; an 
hydraulic cylinder was still imported because it was not available to the same 
quality or, at least, it was available but not by firms that supply the short buckles 
required by RitmoAsia.  
 
At the time of the interview, savings on Chinese components varied between 30% 
and 50%, but, against this, at the beginning returned items had peaks as high as 
80%; for example nickel and zinc Chinese plating firms very seldom produced to  
Western standards, and some  metal components roughly finished were not 
acceptable to RitmoAsia. At the time of the interview a strict monitoring process 
was introduced and the percentage of returned items was lowered to less than 30%, 
but this was still too much. 
                                                           
5 Ritmo remains undisputed leader for electronic machines, where price is less important. 
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The problem of the quality of Chinese components has been tackled and solved 
successfully by Hydroeast, a subsidiary company of the Italian parent company 
Idrobase that produces high-pressure washers. Hydroeast assembles in China 
simple parts for washers and makes several components that are either sent back 
to Italy to be assembled, or are sent as spare parts to the various markets where 
Idrobase sells its products (including USA, Europe and Russia). The Chinese market 
for high-pressure washers is still in its infancy and the volume of production sold in 
China is modest. At the time of the interview the percentage of components 
Hydroeast was returning to Chinese suppliers was less than 2%. The manager of 
the Group tells us: 
 
“We have in China about a hundred suppliers, of which 30 are stable suppliers and 
each of which I know in person. To these I grant constant orders, so that they can 
organize their warehouse and respond to our orders just in time. 
 
Every new component needs a long preparation. On average, from receiving the 
order to the consignment takes one month because our suppliers are small local 
mechanical firms and communication is difficult. The production manager of our 
subsidiary is in daily contact with our suppliers. If they use reliable machines we 
test a few components, randomly, but if the suppliers use machines that we don’t 
consider reliable we test every single component. Any new order is split into two 
suppliers that compete one with another and enter a selection process. 
 
We have chosen small size suppliers because we purchase small bucks and for this 
reason we have localized our plant in a district of small firms [Ningbo south of 
Shanghai]. At the end of the year our suppliers are evaluated and the best suppliers 
(quality, time delivery) are awarded the Hydroeast certified supplier status; we 
organise an award ceremony at which all our suppliers are invited and they take 
enthusiastic part with all their families. We have created in China the relations of 
trust   that we had, and still have, in Veneto with our suppliers” 
 
4.2. Following the main customer. FMMG, DalianMato, Carraro India (Pune) and 
Carraro China (Quingdao), and MiniGeras are 5 firms producing components for 
large international brands. These factories have been established abroad in 
response to the demands of their main customers, and leaders of the value chain, 
which subsequent to deciding to move to Asia have encouraged their suppliers to 
follow suit and off-shore their production. 4 of these firms made a big initial 
investment, around 10-20 millions €.  The fifth, MiniGears has a comparably lean 
structure as it occupies rented premises. 
 
FMMG produces high-range quality yarns using the most advanced cotton spinning 
technologies available on the market. The yarns are used for the production of 
special fabrics for clothing, furnishings, and sophisticated industrial applications 
such as filtration and protective wear. The Group is the leader in Europe in this field. 
 
The managing director of the Group tells us: 
 
“When our main customer, Glen Raven, decided to offshore one of its textile units to 
China we understood that we would not be able to continue to supply it from Europe 
with our yarns, because the cost would be too high. We signed a three-year 
manufacturing agreement with it that covered the start-up of our new plant, and we  
chose a new location in China together with our customer, next to his plant” 
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FMMG’s costs are electric energy (which in Italy is twice than in China), depreciation 
and amortization of machines, and, least significantly, the cost of labour. Production 
is highly automated so that per capita productivity is the same in Italy and China6. 
At the time of the interview the parent company was seeking to utilize the full 
capacity of its Chinese subsidiary by outsourcing orders from Italy.  
 
Carraro, an important mechanical industry firm serving the automotive sector, has 
also internationalized its production by following its main customer. Carraro 
produces axles, and drive-lines for construction machines. The Group also 
manufactures steel gears through its division Gear World. We interviewed the 
manager of TurboGear, in India and MiniGear in China, both controlled by Gear 
World. For Carraro the drive towards off-shoring is due to the necessity to maintain 
proximity to its main customers, while work force issues and components 
availability are less important. In fact, Carraro’s main customers base their 
reputation on an efficient repair capability, and so require Carraro to supply 
components as quickly as possible. 
 
For all firms of this group the main customers provide guarantees to purchase  a 
substantial part (but not all) of total production, about 30-50% of the capacity. 
Then, the supplier needs to develop its own marketing activity to sell the remaining 
product. For example Glen Raven guaranteed for three years to purchase 3 tons a 
day of yarn from FMMG, which amounted to 40% of the plant’s production,  but only 
13% of the estimated optimal capacity. To successfully place the remaining part on 
the Chinese market is a difficult task. The manager explains the problem: 
 
“We had two customers in Europe, buying yarns for their industrial filters, one 
German and one Scottish, both of which off-shored to China and once we also 
moved there we  felt sure we would be able to continue to sell to them. It has not 
been so. Both have left us and have chosen new Chinese producers that sell to 
them at a price that is 1/3 of our price.  Filters sold in China are of very low quality 
and our price is not competitive but they are preferred because of the absence of 
strict regulatory standards in the domestic market. 
 
Not so for our yarns sold in Turkey where the quality of our yarn is appreciated and 
we are able to sell to Turkish firms even though our product is more expensive than 
competitors’ prices. The reason is that Turkish firms sell mainly to European 
countries where the observation of regulatory standards is compulsory” 
 
Among the main customers of Carraro India and China are producers of tractors and 
construction machines. In India, the factory opened in 1999, under pressure from 
Case New Holland; it produces for Case, Caterpillar, John Deere and others and 
axles for lorries too; a limited quota, 5-10% of production, is supplied to the Indian 
firms Larsen&Toubro and Mahindra (for its tractors). India is the largest world 
market for tractors, but only recently have producers started producing 4 wheel 
drive vehicles, whose axles are a speciality of Carraro. In this sector, interest in the 
Asian market has grown in recent years. For example, Caterpillar has moved a 
significant part of its business to Asia, and in 2008 this market was responsible for 
20% of its turnover (compared with 12% in 2006). To reinforce its presence on the 
                                                           
6 In fact, during the world crisis employment in the Chinese plant  declined by 1/3 and then at the first sign 
of recovery, in the early 2010, the management  increased staff working hours (12 hours a day instead of 
the previous 8 hours, for 6 days) leaving unaffected the number of employees, and so the per capita 
production is now much higher in China than in Italy. 
 12 
Asian market it has recently purchased the Korean firm Jinsung, which produces 
undercarriage components. The establishment of the two Carraro factories is a part 
of the trend to follow major customers to Asia, although the managers of the two 
plants keep a fairly diversified customer portfolio; as well as producing for similar 
customers to its sister Indian factory, the Quingdao plant also makes steel gears for 
Kone, the Finnish multinational that produces lifts, escalators, and  loading bays, 
and which  in 2005 purchased significant enterprises  in Asia (Giant Elevators in 
China and Fuji Lift&Escalator in Malaysia).  
 
To sell on the Asian market is difficult and a significant part of the Indian 
production, and a small part of the Chinese production, are sent back to Europe. For 
example, both in India and China, Carraro factories build drivers for eolic turbines 
required by the Carraro German subsidiary O&K. The global recession of the last 
two years has drastically reduced orders from international corporations and Carraro 
managers are now targeting the more flourishing Chinese and Indian markets; the 
attempt to sell domestically has been delegated by the manager of the China plant, 
to a Chinese dealer Guangzhou Match and prospects are favorable.  
  
One characteristic that distinguishes the 2 Carraro factories, in India and China, is 
that the second is able to find on the domestic market high-level subcontractors 
supplying gears of high quality that in India are not easy to find. Consequently, the 
factories in India and China have different structures; in India the factory is 
vertically integrated with the nearby plant Turbo Gear that belongs to the same 
Group and, has its own steel hardening process, and sells 50% of its steel gear 
production to Carraro India. In the case of the Chinese Carraro factory, in contrast, 
steel gears are purchased from third parties, the customer taking advantage of the 
opportunity to source from large firms that work for the army; only a few special 
parts, such as gaskets, are imported from Italy. 
 
The subsidiary MiniGear in Souzhou was established to supply small metal sinterized 
gears to  international producers of electric and gardening tools who  have moved to 
China a part of their production (such as Bosh, Black&Decker, and Sthil); 57% of 
Minigear’s production is sold to international firms operating in China, 27% to firms 
operating in North America and the remaining part to companies in Europe. The 
decision to off-shore MiniGears was completely independent from the decision to 
off-shore Carraro in Quingdao.  
 
The industrial cost in China of the main Carraro product, axles, was at the time of 
my  interview,  30% less than for similar products manufactured in Europe, and  
15% higher than for those made  in India. 
 
DalianMato Furniture and components started 2 years ago. The factory is located in 
the export industrial zone of Dalian, to the north East of Beijing, and produces solid 
wood kitchen doors. Raw material include imported water varnish (Ica), dried wood 
imported from the United States (oak), Russia and Estonia (ash and birch), and 
wood panels  bought directly in China7.  DalianMato  exports doors  to large kitchen 
producers, including British  and American manufacturers, among these the Ikea 
group. For this producer also off-shoring has been in response to pressure from  its 
main customers which required door panel production at a price the parent 
company was not able to produce  in Italy.   
 
                                                           
7 China is a wood resource poor country with a very low forest per capita density. 
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Purchasing agreements are arranged by the Italian headquarters and DalianMato 
acts in fact as an off-shored plant of Mobilclan. The lower unit cost of production in 
the Chinese plant is the result of the low cost of labour. In China the cost of labour 
is around 5% of the total cost of production. Raw materials account for 70% and 
varnishes for 15%. The remaining 10% or so is down to general expenditures. Local 
suppliers provide all the packaging material. At the time of the visit the main 
customer was Ikea USA. It would not have purchased the more expensive kitchen 
doors produced by Mobilclan in Italy and  demanded a product at a lower price, a 
demand that the Italian plant was not able to meet. 
 
In all these firms the cost of labour is not a significant part of production costs. For 
all except DalianMato, it amounts to less than 5% of total costs. For DalianMato, the 
firm that in relation to its turnover employs the most workers, the percentage is a 
little more. 
 
4.3. Market size while keeping firm specific advantages. Faram and Zamperla 
produce in China and Tessitura Monti in India. All three have brand names, patents, 
technology, and organisational know-how, which help to explain their choices in 
favour of direct investment. At the same time they are faced by increased 
competition on the international market and have off-shored their production to 
reduce the costs of production and also to develop a strategic location.  
 
Faram Group is a world leader in the design and manufacture of office furniture and 
partitions, and is characterised by its use of leading edge technology, and its 
products by functionality, ergonomics, durability and environmental friendliness. 
Faram has four production plants in Italy and one in China. The typical customer is 
a architecture studio and Faram takes part in different competitions at the 
international level. The subsidiary Great Faram Wall Decoration was created 
following the visit to Italy of a delegation of Beijing municipality looking for foreign 
investments. Faram Great Wall is majority controlled by Faram, through the 
subsidiary Faram Hong Kong, while the Beijing Building Materials Group, a holding 
of the municipality, has minority control.  
 
Zamperla is a big producer and world leader of rides for the amusement industry 
and in the designing of the layout of amusement parks. In China, Zamperla realizes 
a quarter of the group total turnover. Zamperla has other production plants in 
Russia, Slovakia, and the Philippines. With the appreciation of the Euro the increase 
in production costs made it difficult for Zamperla to continue to sell from Europe to 
China and the parent company decided to offshore production to reduce costs. 
Initially, a plant was set up in the Philippines because it was seen as offering a 
“Western” milieu and an avoidance of linguistic problems, but it did not prove the 
right choice for selling to China where Philippino exports were subject to duties. 
Zamperla then moved directly to China where it opened a factory in Suzhou, close 
to Shanghai. The products are often single rides, or produced in very short series 
(7-8 rides). They are reworks of designs produced in Italy and are assembled using 
parts and components made by Chinese subcontractors.  
 
A quite different story is that of Tessitura Monti. This is an important firm producing 
high quality cotton textile fabrics, mainly for shirt making. Monti has suffered from 
an adverse market for classic garments, and by competition from low cost 
producers, and has chosen to transfer almost the whole of its production to its new 
plant in India, and to two plants it owns in the Czech Republic, which were 
previously producing for it as subcontractors. Only design, the manufacture of 
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textile samples and a very limited segment of the production process has been 
retained in Italy. At the end of the nineties, the Italian plant had almost 1000 
employees and produced 20 millions metres of textiles. Today, production is split 
between the Indian plant that at the time of the interview produced 7-8 million 
metres, but had a capacity double that, and the two Czech Republic plants (1-2 
millions metres), and the Italian plant (250 thousand metres) (Campagnol and 
Tattara, 2008). 
 
All three enterprises, Faram, Zamperla and Monti, initially sought out low labour 
cost. Faram and Zamperla also took into account the availability in China of 
components of good quality at reduced cost, while Monti was attracted by the good 
quality cotton yarn available in India. All three have emphasized the fiscal 
advantages connected to the locations they chose (at least for the first years of 
activity). The cost of labour in India is half of the cost in China: 100€ a month per 
Indian blue collar for Monti and 180-200€ for Zamperla and  Faram. The difference 
is bigger for skilled workers who in China earn more than twice the wage paid in 
India. 
  
All three factories have autonomous design capacities, with skilled technicians who 
are able to adapt designs produced in Italy. Tessitura Monti has a complex 
administrative department that takes charge of the large initial investment and that 
markets the product in India where, at the time of the interview, almost half of the 
production of the Indian plant was sold. Great Faram Wall has autonomy from the 
management of Faram in respect of market research and a tacit understanding that 
Great Faram Wall takes responsibility for developing its activities in Asia and in the 
Middle East, markets out of reach of the Italian parent company. In respect of raw 
materials, Great Faram Wall is supplied for 75-90% of its needs by the local Chinese 
market and for 25-10% by the Italian market. From Italy come some of its veneers, 
locks, metal accessories, and varnishes8. From China come all other supplies: 
aluminium, steel, hinges (German brands but made in China), glass, chipboard 
composite and some veneers. Among the Chinese suppliers, two are considered 
strategic: one in South China supplies aluminium table legs; the second produces 
aluminium bars that are used in partitions; bars are subsequently shaped in 
outsourcing in Beijing by a firm that manufactures them in a space inside the Great 
Faram Wall premises, closely supervised by Faram. 
 
Zamperla in Shanghai leases premises, which means it had a lower initial 
investment. 95% of parts and components are purchased in China; the remaining 
5% comes from the Philippines or from the parent company in Italy (some 
electronic parts). A lean production structure is reflected in a reduced number of 
employees, who are mainly skilled. Out of 64 employees, 11 are engineers and 7 
are skilled technicians who engage in design and quality control of parts and 
components and certification procedures for the final product. 60% of the Chinese 
production is sold in China, where Zamperla is the leading producer of amusement 
parks, in Indonesia and in the United States. Chinese safety standards are similar to 
those demanded in Western countries. 
 
Tessitura Monti has an entirely different structure as it is vertically integrated, 
including the manufacture of raw yarns and cotton fabrics. From the parent 
company in Italy come design and dies; although dies are sometimes also 
                                                           
8 Sometimes varnishes and sand paper are also bought in China where they are produced under European 
licence. 
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purchased in India where they are manufactured under European licence. Machines 
used in manufacture are almost all Italian or German, most of them brought from 
the parent Italian plant or from the company’s Czech Republic plants, and have 
been imported duty exempted under special provision. From 35% to 40% of the 
Indian production is sold to Aquarelle (a firm 50% controlled by Monti) which has a 
plant in Bangalore with 500 employees where shirts are made under subcontracting 
arrangements for well-known brands (including Zara and other European firms), 
and which also sells directly on the East Asian markets. Other customers of Monti 
are European shirt manufacturing brands to which Monti distributes products 
through the parent company in Italy. 
 
The Faram plant in China has a unit cost that is half of that of the Italian plant for a 
comparable item; this is a significant difference, although the price is not the crucial 
competitive element in the market for high level furniture. Off-shoring reduces the 
labour cost to 1/5 of the cost in Italy, and the cost of parts and components of local 
origin is reduced by 1/39. Some competitors exist in the Chinese market; the 
biggest one is Boloni, a medium size group, which is active in furniture and which  
in recent years has looked  to progress into design. 
 
Zamperla has a similar structure, with a reduced incidence of the cost of labour, as 
the plant assembles components that are produced by third parties. The cost 
reduction due to the cost of labour is the same as for Great Faram Wall, with a 
larger savings in components purchases that represent 50% of costs, as Zamperla 
is basically an assembly plant. The total saving on a comparable ride produced in 
Italy is around 40%. 
 
The extent of cost reduction of Tessitura Monti in relation to equivalent Italian 
production is bigger than for Great Faram Wall and  Zamperla. The following table 
sets out the costs for the Indian plant for 1 metre of cotton fabric “I dogi”. The cost 
of cotton fabric produced in Italy is 6-7€ per metre and at this cost the firm is no 
longer competitive in the international market. As Mr. Monti tells us: 
 
“It is no longer possible to meet international competition with cotton textiles 
produced in Italy. All factories are closing down. The high cost of labour, the high 
cost of energy and the appreciation of the Euro have put us out of the market. 
 
Our main competitor produces in the Czech Republic and in 2009 it set up a new 
plant in Egypt. Now the cost of labour in the Czech Republic has rapidly increased 
and the country has lost its attractiveness” 
 
The cost structure for producing 1 metre of cotton fabric in the India plant is 
detailed in table 3. This fabric is sent to Italy to be sanforized and distributed from 
the Italian headquarters. 
 
Tabella 3. Industrial cost for 1 metre cotton fabric in India,  € 
 
raw cotton yarn 44,77 
dying 10,36  
energy 18,08  
labour 3,86 
                                                           
9 For a unit value of a comparable product the cost structure in China (Italy) is the following: parts and 
components 47% (38%), labour 15% (39%), depreciation and general expenses 38% (23%). 
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maintenance 5,18 
depreciation 12,32 
others 5,43 
 100,00 
total cost per metre 1,91€  
sanforization (Italy) 0,47€ 
Total 2,38€ 
 
The unit cost of production in India is around 2,38 € per metre, 1/3 of the cost in 
Italy, and consequently after 2005 Monti began again to make  profits,  although 
the capacity of the Indian plant is still underutilized. 
 
5. Governance of the value chains, geography and competences 
 
My sample of Italian direct investments in China and India have been clustered in 
three typologies according to the motive that brought the firms to Asia and to the 
roles the firms played in the value chain. These are: “manufacturing directly low 
cost components for sending back to the parent firm”; “following important 
customers that were seeking quality and delivery in rapid time”; and  “looking for  
substantial cost reductions while keeping firm specific advantages (such as brands, 
patents, and capabilities)”. Some firms share characteristics common to 2 or all of 
the 3 typologies and cross the imaginary borders that make our classification a 
useful but a provisional solution. 
 
Some firms moved to Asia in pursuit of an initial project that soon proved faulty. 2 
of them intentionally rectified the initial choice, adapting the factory to a more 
profitable strategy. I refer to this choice as “exaptation”, a term imported from 
biology as the change has implied a new functionality in the product or in the 
management of the value chain (Villani et al. 2007; Lane et al., 2009). The 
management of General Fittings sought clients in a new sector. In order to increase 
revenue and profits they used machines they already had in their factories, and 
production techniques they already used, but for a new functionality, that is to 
make automobile components, which they didn't make before. The manager of 
RitmoAsia sought local subcontractors for almost all components that were 
previously imported from Italy, delivering a considerable cost reduction; only a few 
strategic components were still imported. This move implied a process of selection 
of suppliers, a standardization of production, the ensuring of quality control, and the 
development of relations of trust. This was a difficult process for a small firm like 
RitmoAsia, as the market for components both in China and India is not well 
developed and reliable components are often produced by companies supplying big 
orders for large international firms, but not the limited amounts demanded by small 
sized customers (Lemoine, Ünal-Kesenci, 2002; Kaplinsky, 2008). The local supply 
market for components and parts that can be sourced by a small firm like RitmoAsia 
is composed of backward local firms who lack testing equipment and whose product 
quality is often inconsistent (Humphrey, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2010). They are not 
capable of implementing the correct procedures, do not know the proper 
vocabulary, and technology is seldom trustworthy.  
 
Small foreign firms that want to buy components locally need to engage in a 
process similar to that which lead to the formation of Italian industrial districts. 
Many difficulties would prove more tractable if large Italian firms were present in 
Asia, as this size of firm can help to create a network of local reliable producers. 
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This is what happened in Italian districts in the sixties when large firms outsourced 
a part of their production and created a market for parts and components that was 
at the origin of production fragmentation, capability building, and specialization that 
are the cornerstones of the industrial districts10. Hydroeast, mindful of the way its  
network of suppliers has been formed in Italy, has built in China a network of 
trusted  suppliers. This process RitmoAsia is going through, although at the time of 
our visit the number of rejects was still much too high.  
 
Let us consider Carraro. In the past this firm outsourced in Italy, especially in the 
neighbourhood of its main plant near Padova, and encouraged some of its 
employees to set up their own plants, leasing them some of its own machines. Now 
the Italian plant assembles components that are produced in the district. In its 
Chinese plant all the manufacturing process takes place inside the firm but some 
manufacturing processes, such as hardening, are carried out externally. Every order 
is split into three main suppliers and three second tier suppliers, allowing the 
company to gradually select the best suppliers. In China it has a sophisticated 
department to test incoming components, a function that in Italy does not exist as 
components are certified by the suppliers themselves. For its India plant, there is a 
lack of adequate suppliers and the factory is much more vertically integrated than 
the factory in China, and many more operations are performed inside the plant. 
Value chain structure evolves in a path dependent country specific way. 
 
Other Italian firms selling on the international market went to Asia in search of a 
direct cut in production costs, while retaining their brand names and maintaining 
strict control over suppliers. Savings on costs included labour, but also energy,  raw 
materials (cotton yarns for Tessitura Monti), and plastic, mechanical and metal 
components for Great Faram Wall, Zamperla and others. All managers pointed out 
that since the appreciation of the Euro, producing in Asia provided a profitable 
solution for selling in the American and international markets. The largest firms 
carefully planned the cheaper cost solution. Some smaller ventures have moved to 
Asia without a clear industrial plan and have subsequently adapted.  
 
Firms induced to move to Asia by their main customers are firms producing 
intermediate goods that have moved with their customers. During the recent global 
crisis international demand drastically declined, particularly from the US, and these 
firms have tried to address directly the comparatively more dynamic Asian market, 
in order to fill idle capacity. Producing local and selling local proves to be difficult. 
Carraro appointed a Chinese company to help with domestic sales. Among final 
firms, only two firms have developed a direct retail business in China, Colombini 
and Irsap. Both firms started as joint partnerships with Chinese firms, although at 
the time of the interview Colombini was intending to purchase the share  of its  
Chinese partner. The first, Colombini, is a furniture producer that in China produces 
only children’s furniture in melamine (MDF) and sells 80% of the product of the 
Chinese plant on the local market. The panels and various accessories are bought in 
China, the design is made by a Colombini design team in Italy, and special 
accessories are bought in Italy (e.g. Ferrari11 metal drawer guides). Colombini  in 
China has a unit cost, for the same product, 30% less than the cost of its Italian 
parent company. The lower cost is due both to savings on labour and on 
                                                           
10 As Langlois (2003) puts it Williamson’s famous heuristic dictum…”In the beginning there were markets” 
is simply not true. For the role of large firms in Italian districts see Tattara (2001). For a recent 
assessment of the Italian districts see Becattini et al. 2009. 
11 As the manager tells us: “I could buy them here, but the brand Ferrari deeply impresses the Chinese 
customers, although it is just an homonym of the famous racing car maker”. 
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components, particularly metal and glass parts. The sale price is higher that that of 
competitive products by 7-8%, but the difference reflects  a recognised quality 
premium. 
 
The entrance into the Chinese market has not been easy and has required  a huge 
investment and also management dedication. Colombini, at present, has in China 50 
retail stores selling under its own brand, each with the same design, colour and 
atmosphere. These stores are located inside “furniture cities” that are run in 
franchising12 at a cost that is clearly lower than the cost in Europe. A second selling 
route is that of sales to purchasing groups. These are common in China when 
lessees or new owners purchase, and then need to furnish, flats that are part of a 
new block, a frequent occurrence due to the fast growth of the Chinese cities. These 
groups operate on the internet and Colombini has a strong presence in this market.  
 
The second example is the company Irsap which has purchased Golden Tiger 
Radiators in Beijing, a firm producing radiators. Following the purchase, IRSAP  
brought to China its own machines, made to its design (mainly tubular radiators). 
All production is for the high end of the market and has been developed for China 
and Russia. For the market in China the firm has built on the experience of Golden 
Tiger Radiators and its personnel. IRSAP maintains direct sales links to building 
firms, in addition to selling through retailers. 80% of sales are in the town of 
Beijing, where the climate is harsher and the population richer than in other towns. 
 
Retail distribution on the Chinese market is difficult as the product first requires to 
be reworked to make it suitable for Chinese tastes and habits. For example, 
Colombini reports considerable waste adapting Italian designs to the size of  wood 
panels sold in China that are of different size  to those sold in Europe. Children’s 
rooms in China often require a grandmother’s bed, a different layout of the project 
and the retail network is organised very differently than in Italy. 
 
An element that prevents Italian firms from selling components to China is a lack of 
regulatory standards in this market. Typical is FMMG that sells regularly in North 
America, but is not able to sell on the domestic market because a lack of adequate 
regulatory standards makes its products for exports too expensive for the domestic 
market. This is a situation shared by General Fittings which die casts two kind of 
brass bars, with different specifications and prices for the two markets13. 
 
China and India differ from Europe in authority, culture, legal traditions, business 
systems, and political risk (Prevezer, 2008; Estrin, Prevezer, 2010). Only 2 Italian 
managers out of the 15 we interviewed write Chinese, so every relation, from 
relations with workers to relations with the political authority, has to be 
intermediated. The Chinese system is described by Italian managers as a flexible 
system where all is negotiable, from the basic rules that govern labour to taxes, 
export permission, and more. The system is for the most part considered adequate 
and attentive to the needs of foreign firms, particularly outside of the main cities, in 
the periphery, where foreign investments are most in demand, are a sign of 
distinction for the political leaders in their effort to alleviate unemployment, and 
negotiations are much easier. No one entrepreneur referred to the system as 
corrupt, but all agreed that interacting with Chinese institutions takes a lot of 
                                                           
12 Colombini enters into a continuing contractual relationship with local distributors that operate under 
the franchisor's trade name, with the franchisor's guidance, in exchange for a fee. 
13 Standards are likely to be of reduced significance for China according to Kaplinski et al. 2010b; 
Kaplinski et al. 2010a; Humphrey, 2008. 
 19 
learning through  trial and error. In India, transparency is much more valued but 
political uncertainty is much higher and this negatively affects foreign 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Is it possible to envisage a favourable scenario where Italian firms keep in Italy 
higher value added production? This is not likely as Asian countries do not lack 
skilled technicians. Carraro China has signed an agreement with a polytechnic that 
supplies good engineers. Tessitura Monti has trained its workers through an 
international training institute with satisfactory results. In India, Carraro has 
invested in design and has created a design office with a staff of 45 engineers, 
directed by an Indian manager, that works in symbiosis with the design department 
of Carraro Padova (specifically AgriCarraro, to design the small tractors that big 
brand subcontract to it) and the number of its employees is to increase in the near 
future. The cost is half of the cost of a newly employed engineer in Italy, so the 
difference is not as big as the difference in blue collar wages, but flexibility and 
versatility of high level engineers is greater in India than in Italy. 
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